Tata Steel
BSE SENSEX
33,845
S&P CNX
10,397
21 February 2018
Update
| Sector:
Metals
CMP: INR641
TP: INR778(+21%)
Neutral
Strategic bids for Bhushan may drag stock performance
However, it is a long-term positive. Maintain Neutral
Sketchy picture of likely acquisitions
Stock Info
Bloomberg
Equity Shares (m)
52-Week Range (INR)
1, 6, 12 Rel. Per (%)
M.Cap. (INR b)
M.Cap. (USD b)
12M Avg Val (INR m)
Free float (%)
TATA IN
971
747 / 404
-5/-1/21
623
9.7
3263.0
68.7
Financials Snapshot (INR b)
Y/E Mar
2018E 2019E 2020E
Net Sales
1,286 1,279
691
EBITDA
215
228
164
PAT
69
84
74
EPS (INR)
57.7
69.4
61.5
Gr. (%)
51.9
20.4 -11.5
BV/Sh (INR)
397
457
509
RoE (%)
15.9
16.3
12.7
RoCE (%)
11.8
11.7
9.7
P/E (x)
11.1
9.2
10.4
P/BV (x)
1.6
1.4
1.3
Shareholding pattern (%)
As On
Dec-17 Sep-17 Dec-16
Promoter
31.4
31.4
31.4
DII
28.5
29.7
30.8
FII
17.1
15.7
13.1
Others
23.1
23.3
24.8
FII Includes depository receipts
Stock Performance (1-year)
Tata Steel
Sensex - Rebased
800
700
600
500
400
According to media reports, Tata Steel (TATA) has emerged as the top bidder in
the recent IRP (Insolvency Resolution Professional)-administered auction of
two steel assets, i.e., Bhushan Steel Ltd (BSL), the listed entity promoted by
Neeraj Singhal, and Bhushan Power and Steel (BPS), the unlisted entity
promoted by Sanjay Singhal. Although details of the deals are still sketchy, it
appears that TATA will own a 74% stake in the debt-laden (though reduced to
INR362b) BSL and an 88% stake in BPS (INR182b debt), with commitment to
bring additional capital (not sure if equity or debt or preference share) toward
working capital and pending capex. On consolidation, net debt will increase by
INR544b (or more) at the end of FY20, assuming that additional capital
requirement for working capital and capex will be met from internal accruals
once the interest burden comes down on refinancing.
Valuations may appear expensive, but are in line with replacement cost
BSL and BPS are essentially non-integrated flat steel product producers. We
believe that these assets can produce 7-8mt saleable steel with current
facilities. The business models are similar to JSW Steel. Operating cost for JSW
Steel is lower as its furnaces are much larger, while it pays slightly more for
iron ore due to its location. JSW Steel pays less outward freight due to
proximity to market. Therefore, we believe BSL and BPS’ EBTIDA per ton are
likely to be either same or a tad lower than JSW Steel’s margins of INR7,000-
9,000/t across cycle. Assuming INR8,000 average EBITDA/t across the cycle for
BSL and BPS, the valuation of INR544b is at ~8.5xEV/EBITDA (or more
expensive) after factoring in FCF of the target for two years. Naturally, this
appears expensive compared to sector average EV/EBITDA valuation multiple
of 6 to 7x, and this acquisition is likely to drag the stock performance over the
near-to-medium term. According to our calculations, the target price may get
eroded by 13% to INR677, based on 6.5xEV/EBTIDA and book value for CWIP.
Peak debt will be INR920-1,000b in FY20E (excluding European business).
Although valuations appear expensive, they are in line with the replacement
cost. It makes strategic sense for TATA as it can leverage its captive iron ore
mines (subject to getting statutory permissions) and drive market synergies.
Captive iron ore mining leases have only 12 years of remaining validity. Over 5-
10 years, the additional INR50-80b upfront cost will not matter much, and
perhaps, it can be offset by additional mining profit. This will catapult TATA’s
capacity from 13mtpa to 25mtpa in 3-4 years.
Investors are advised to refer through important disclosures made at the last page of the Research Report.
Motilal Oswal research is available on www.motilaloswal.com/Institutional-Equities, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Factset and S&P Capital.
Sanjay Jain – Research Analyst
(SanjayJain@MotilalOswal.com); +91 22 6129 1523
Dhruv Muchhal – Research Analyst
(Dhruv.Muchhal@MotilalOswal.com); +91 22 6129 1549